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FINANCING FLORIDA'S FUTURE: REVENUE BOND LAW
IN FLORIDA
R. WILLIAM IDE, 111* AND DONALD P. UBELL**
I. INTRODUCTION
Florida has experienced an explosive population growth which is
placing severe demands on the state and its political subdivisions
to provide capital improvements. This growth is expected to con-
tinue uninterrupted into the twenty-first century, when Florida
will be the fourth most populous state in the country.' A heavy
percentage of Florida's immigrants who will cause the population
to swell are the "young old," who, as they age to the "old old"
demographic category,2 will require housing, health care facilities, s
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1972, Georgia State University. Private Practice, Kutak Rock & Campbell, Atlanta, Georgia.
** B.A. 1967, University of North Carolina; J.D. 1969, University of Michigan. Private
Practice, Kutak Rock & Campbell, Atlanta, Georgia.
1. Florida's population was over six million in 1970; by 1980, the population had grown
to over nine million, a 43.5% increase. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 197 (1984).
With an annual growth rate of three percent, Florida will be the fourth most populous state
by 1990. Sipe & Starnes, Florida's Infrastructure: Past and Future Requirements, ECON.
LEAFLETS, Sept. 1983, at 1-2. The following statement exemplifies the situation: "The growth
of the City of Sunrise reflects the growth of the State of Florida during the past twenty
years. In 1967 the City had a population of less than 3,200 people. By 1976 its population
exceeded 32,000. The physical area of the City has increased 120 times." State v. City of
Sunrise, 354 So. 2d 1206, 1207 (Fla. 1978).
2. The "young old" are considered to be those aged 60-69. They live largely an indepen-
dent existence, with steadily increasing dependence as they move into the "old old" cate-
gory, over age 80. See generally Witty & Spicie, Building a Dream City for the Aged, CON-
TEMP. AD., Nov. 1983, at 36; The Challenge of Choosing a Nursing Home, Bus. WK., Nov. 22,
1982, at 122. Congregate care facilities are an example of the kind of projects designed to
accommodate and serve these individuals. Under this concept, a resident of a housing unit
maintains the degree of independent living that he or she is capable of and draws on the
available services to the degree he or she must. For example, the health facility provides the
security of immediate health care attention, assists with administration of drugs, allows for
on-site outpatient care, and provides therapy treatment. A resident is entitled to remain in
the congregate care project until his or her death, until he or she fails to pay the monthly
health care facility fee, or until continued occupancy presents a danger to the resident or to
other residents; if the resident is unable to continue independent living in an apartment
unit, he or she can be moved to the skilled health care facility.
3. "Currently some 1.3 million Americans, 5% of those over 65, fill the country's 21,500
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and ancillary services4 well beyond current capacity. In addition,
other public needs such as water and sewer systems, solid waste
disposal facilities, jails, roads, and schools must be met.5
Just when these demands are becoming most intense, the availa-
bility of federal funds to meet them has lessened.' Beginning with
the Carter Administration and extending through the Reagan Ad-
ministration, the federal government has progressively reduced
revenue sharing grants and loans to the states for construction and
maintenance of the infrastructure: the basic network of facilities
such as transportation, water and sewer systems, and solid waste
disposal systems.7 In the categories of capital projects, this trend is
even more pronounced. Diminished federal funds may be justified,
in part, on the basis that their original purpose was to alleviate
diminished state and local tax capacity.' Today, however, the fed-
eral government is running a substantial deficit and state govern-
ments, with few exceptions, have budget surpluses. 10
[nursing] homes nearly to capacity." Moore, Way Out Front: Nursing Homes, FORTUNE,
June 13, 1983, at 142. "There is already a shortage of nursing beds." Blyskal, Gray Gold,
FORBES, Nov. 23, 1981, at 80. "According to the National Council of Health Centers, which
represents proprietary nursing homes, some 235,000 beds must be added in the next decade
to the 1.6 million existing places to meet anticipated demand." The Challenge of Choosing a
Nursing Home, supra note 2, at 122.
4. "Ancillary services" include adult day-care centers, home health aides, communal
meals, congregate living, physical therapy, and recreational therapy.
5. See generally JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS, HARD CHOICES: A REPORT ON
THE INCREASING GAP BETWEEN AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS AND OUR ABILITY To PAY
FOR THEM (Feb. 1984).
6. For example, the amount of federal Environmental Protection Agency grants were
reduced from $4.4 billion in 1980, to $3.5 billion in 1981, and to a current level of $2.4
billion. Giglio, Infrastructure Banks Can Relieve States' Financing Problems, BOND BUYER,
Mar. 8, 1984, at 18.
7. The Office of Management and Budget reported that federal spending on public
works peaked in 1980 and that constant dollar funding levels for local infrastructure needs
had been "substantially trimmed" in the subsequent three fiscal years. U.S. Has Sharply
Cut Local Public Works Aid, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1984, at 21, col. 2. Information collected
by the Tax Foundation shows that federal grants to state and local governments in FY 1983
actually increased by four percent, an amount approximating the rate of inflation, to $88.8
billion. FY 1982, however, showed a $7 billion decline from the FY 1981 level of $92.5 billion
so that grants remain below their peak level. US Grants-in-Aid to Localities Rose by 4% in
Fiscal '83, BOND BUYER, May 11, 1984, at 20.
8. Craig, Impact of Federal Policies on Municipal Bond Financing, 34 NAT'L TAX J. 389,
391-92 (1981); Wolman & Peterson, State and Local Government Strategies for Responding
to Fiscal Pressure, 55 TuL. L. REV. 773, 786-87 (1981).
9. See, e.g., Watt, The Goals and Objectives of General Revenue Sharing, 419 ANNALS
13-17 (1975), reprinted in STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 620-21 (S. Sato & A. Van
Alstyne 2d ed. 1977); Herbers, Should Washington Share Revenue With States?, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 22, 1981, § B, at 8, col. 2.
10. See, e.g., Local Surpluses Won't Slay the Monster Deficit, Bus. WK., Oct. 22, 1984,
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In the past, states and municipalities" have shifted to private
corporations part of their burden of providing traditional services
by assisting private corporations with their financing of projects.
The municipality would sell an issue of industrial development
bonds (IDB's) and in turn loan the proceeds to the private entity.
As the interest on IDB's is, with certain limitations, tax exempt,'"
purchasers of such bonds can achieve a greater after-tax return on
their investment as compared with non-tax-exempt bonds. Thus,
the municipality can offer bonds bearing a reduced rate of interest.
This savings is ultimately passed along through a lower interest
rate on the loan to the private entity as an incentive to engage in
the desired development. The private entity then uses the pro-
ceeds to construct the desired facility with ownership remaining in
the private entity. The debt service on the bonds is paid from the
revenues of the project and secured by the project itself and any
additional guarantees by the private entity. The governmental en-
tity does not pledge its full faith and credit behind the bonds.
Thus, municipalities have been able to shift a portion of the re-
sponsibility for providing basic services to private entities, which
in turn recover their costs from the users of the facilities.
The continued advantage of tax-exempt status for municipal-
based borrowings, however, is threatened. Recently enacted federal
legislation would severely curtail the use of IDB's, even when the
facilities serve purposes one would normally characterize as public,
such as pollution control or solid waste disposal.' New Internal
at 62.
11. The word "municipalities" as the term is used within the context of this article re-
fers to any county, municipality, taxing district, or other political subdivision within the
state, whether incorporated by special act of the legislature or under the general laws of the
state, which is authorized to issue bonds.
12. I.R.C. § 103(a) (CCH 1984) excludes income from state and local obligations from
federal income taxation. Section 103(b)(1), however, excludes industrial development bonds
from the definition of state and local obligations unless they meet certain requirements set
forth in the remainder of § 103(b). Certain facilities, including those for pollution control,
are listed in § 103(b)(4) as projects which will continue to qualify for tax-exempt IDB
financing.
13. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 severely limits the availability of tax-exempt industrial
development bonds to meet infrastructure needs with private development by restricting
the amount of IDB's which may be issued within a given state and restricting the types of
projects which qualify for such financing. See generally I.R.C. § 103(b) (CCH 1984).
Docks, wharves, convention and trade show facilities, airports, and mass transit facilities
are exempt from the state cap provisions; however, they remain subject to the limits on
depreciation and the more restrictive arbitrage limits that were imposed by the Act. In addi-
tion, § 103(b)(17)(A) imposes limits on the amount of bond proceeds that may be used for
the acquisition of land.
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Revenue Code section 103(n), for example, places a ceiling on the
amount of "private activity bonds" that may be issued per year in
each state. The term private activity bond includes most industrial
development bonds.14 The ceiling is $200 million or $150 times the
state's population, whichever is greater.
Because of the size of the capital required for infrastructure
projects, it is unrealistic to expect current year revenues of states
or municipalities to be able to finance them.15 As a result of the
new limitations on IDB usage, government entities will be forced
to move away from IDB's and find alternative sources of financing.
Under the Code definition, when at least seventy-five percent of
the proceeds are used directly or indirectly by a governmental en-
tity or exempt person, the bond will not be considered an indus-
trial development bond. 6 Therefore, bonds which are issued to
provide for basic governmental facilities to be owned and operated
by the governmental entity will not be considered IDB's, and con-
sequently, not subject to the myriad of limitations imposed upon
their use. The interest on these bonds will remain tax exempt
under the general provisions of Internal Revenue Code section
103(a). 17
In many instances, however, governmental entities need to enlist
the support of private developers in constructing and operating
new public facilities. To encourage private development of facili-
ties serving the public interest, it is often necessary to allow the
private developers to retain ownership of and operate the facilities.
Governmental financing of such privately owned and operated fa-
cilities, however, falls within the definition of industrial develop-
ment bonds and is therefore subject to the IDB limitations.
As a result, when the governmental entity wishes to finance pri-
vate development of public projects, two basic types of governmen-
tal obligations will be available-general obligation bonds and rev-
enue bonds. Since ad valorem taxes are pledged in support of
14. I.R.C. § 103(n)(7) (CCH 1984).
15. It is not unusual for a single issue of bonds financing pollution control facilities to
exceed $100 million. Of Tampa's $271 million 1984 budget, for example, $91.3 million was
designated for a capital improvement program. The program includes $53 million for a re-
fuse-to-energy plant and $28 million for improvements to the sewer system. Tampa Sets
$91.3 Million Capital Budget, NATION'S CITIES WEEKLY, Sept. 5, 1983, at 11.
With competing interests seeking IDB financing it is not at all certain that such a large
issue would be allocated a portion of the state ceiling. See Fla. Exec. Order No. 84-181,
Executive Office of the Governor (Oct. 9, 1984).
16. I.R.C. § 103(b)(2)(A) (CCH 1984).
17. See id. § 103(b)(2).
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general obligation bonds18 and since they typically require voter
approval,19 revenue bonds will be a more likely choice in many
situations. 0
States and municipalities will also tend to favor the use of reve-
nue bonds for many projects which they build or acquire in an ef-
fort to place the debt burden on the users of the facilities being
financed.2 Governmental entities may also choose to use revenue
bonds for projects which do not result in traditional "user" fees,
such as jails or government office buildings.22 In some instances, it
18. The general obligation bond is backed by the full faith and credit of the municipal-
ity, while the revenue bond is secured by specifically dedicated income, usually revenues
generated by the project but sometimes supplemented by a collateral revenue source. See,
e.g., Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Acceptance Corp., 358 N.E.2d 848, 851 (N.Y. 1976);
Ramsey v. Cameron, 139 S.E.2d 765, 769 (S.C. 1965). Interest on either obligation may be
exempt from taxation under I.R.C. § 103 (CCH 1984).
A general obligation bond is considered to be one that is "payable from an unlimited
general ad valorem tax on all taxable property." 15 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 43.05, at 479 (3d ed. 1970). A pledge of "full faith and credit" is what turns a bond into a
general obligation bond, since then the government entity has made "both a commitment to
pay and a commitment of the [entity's] revenue generating powers to produce the funds to
pay." Flushing, 358 N.E.2d at 851. The term "general obligation" includes both limited and
unlimited general obligation bonds for purposes of this article. "Full faith and credit" gener-
ally refers to ad valorem tax revenue backing, since the fear against which the constitutional
provisions protect is the "unreasonable taxation of real estate owners." Note, Counties: Su-
preme Court's Substantial Impact on Ad Valorem Taxation, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 175, 175
(1983). Real estate taxes were the primary source of revenues at the time constitutional
restrictions on the use of general obligation bonds were witten. The primary purpose of
these restriction was to protect property owners. See, e.g., State v. City of Jacksonville, 53
So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1951); State ex rel. Capitol Addition Bldg. Comm'n v. Connelly, 46 P.2d
1097, 1101 (N.M. 1935).
19. A bond which is guaranteed by the ad valorem taxing power of the municipality
without the prior approval of the electorate is unconstitutional pursuant to FLA. CONsT. art.
VII, § 12, which provides in pertinent part: "[Liocal governmental bodies with taxing pow-
ers may issue bonds . . . payable from ad valorem taxation and maturing more than twelve
months after issuance only . . . when approved by vote of the electors who are owners of
freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation .... "
20. The referendum process is often protracted and can unnecessarily inhibit the ability
of public officials to govern adequately and to provide needed services quickly. Revenue
bonds, on the other hand, do not require voter approval as a condition of issuance. For a
historical perspective, see Purvis v. City of Little Rock, 667 S.W.2d 936 (Ark. 1984).
21. Since revenue bonds are serviced by the revenue generated by the project (aug-
mented, perhaps, by a collateral revenue source), the people benefiting from the service pay
for it. See Skidmore v. City of Elizabethtown, 291 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956); Wunder-
lich v. City of St. Louis, 511 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1974); Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal
Acceptance Corp., 358 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1976); Ramsey v. Cameron, 139 S.E.2d 765 (S.C.
1965); see also Note, Industrial Development Bonds: Judicial Construction vs. Plant Con-
struction, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 262, 269-70 (1962). Since the total taxing power of an issuer is
not pledged as security for payment of the bonds, revenue bonds typically bear slightly
higher interest rates than the equivalent general obligation bonds would.
22. See generally Rose, Developments in Revenue Bond Financing, 6 U. FLA. L. REv.
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may be possible to pledge certain non-ad valorem revenue sources
as the underlying credit for a revenue bond issue,2" but in other
situations the credit may need to be that of the municipality in
order for the bonds to be successfully marketed.24
Revenue bond issues appear to be used increasingly for state and
local borrowing.2 5 Some may question, however, whether Florida
revenue bond law is ready for the projected onslaught of demands
for the use of these bonds in raising capital. The purpose of this
article is to analyze the present legal framework for the use of rev-
enue bonds in Florida. Part II examines the historical development
of bond financing in Florida. Part 111A analyzes the evolution of
the limitations upon the pledge of the public credit, and Part IIIB
reviews the adoption and judicial construction of the public pur-
pose requirement.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A review of history is essential to an understanding of the types
of projects that can be financed and the credit that can be pledged
under Florida law. Only by appreciating the historical development
of bond financing through changes in the Florida Constitution and
legislation can one be adequately prepared to appreciate the pre-
sent status of the law and the potential to meet Florida's needs
with legal creativity in future revenue bond financings.
Florida law on bond financing seems to have moved in a remark-
385, 394-98 (1953) (discussing expansion of revenue bonds to include facilities not normally
considered to be revenue producing). Non-self-liquidating projects may be funded by bonds
issued under FLA. STAT. ch. 125 (1983). See County of Volusia v. State, 417 So. 2d 968, 975
(Fla. 1982) (Alderman, J., dissenting).
23. See infra notes 57-121 and accompanying text.
24. Bondholders desire that the best possible credit backs the bonds in order to reduce
the likelihood of a default. Therefore, a bond's marketability is enhanced if the underlying
credit is that of the municipality. A number of factors are forcing credit enhancement. Dur-
ing the present period of increasing state and municipal needs for access to the bond mar-
ket, buyers of bonds are becoming more credit conscious. Traditional buyers of bonds are
turning to alternative investment opportunities for a number of reasons: the reduction in
tax rates for individuals and corporations, past poor performance of the municipal bond
market, the availability of better investment opportunities, and some defaults in the munic-
ipal market. In addition, state and local banks have taken a diminished role as buyers. See
Craig, supra note 8, at 392-93.
25. In 1983, revenue bonds constituted 72% or $58.78 billion of the $81.2 billion total in
state and local government issues. The 1982 share was 70% or $53.9 billion. Tax-Exempt
Volume of 1983 Sets Record of $8.2 Billion, BOND BUYER, Jan. 3, 1984, at 1. The 10-year
trend shows revenue bonds increasing from 24% of total state and local government issues
in 1974 to 72% in 1983. A Decade of Municipal Financing, BOND BUYER, Dec. 8, 1983.
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able parallel to the fluctuations in its economy.2 6 Cyclical economic
patterns have generated predictable constitutional, legislative, and
judicial responses. The pattern is one of economic expansion, over-
extension of government debt, severe recession, and legislative re-
strictions on the ability of governments to incur debt. Once the
pattern has been run, it repeats itself. As the economic picture im-
proves, pressure grows to evade the legal restrictions on public
debt. The courts acquiesce in the erosion of the restrictions, over-
extension eventually reoccurs, and the pattern begins anew.
In the early 1800's many Florida municipalities issued general
obligation bonds and loaned the proceeds to private enterprises for
such purposes as railroad building and canal construction.2 7 When
many of these businesses subsequently failed and were unable to
make payments to the municipalities, the government entities were
required to levy additional taxes to meet their obligations on the
bonds. 28 Florida reacted to this questionable commitment of the
taxing power by including its first constitutional restrictions on
bond issuance in the 1868 constitution.2 These limitations in the
1868 constitution, although designed to control debt financing,
were insufficient to keep the legislature from extensively obligating
the state tax resources for investments in private enterprise.30
26. Florida's history contains a succession of economic booms, including (1) from 1763 to
1783, when Florida passed from Spanish control and became an English territory; (2) devel-
opment before the Civil War; (3) reconstruction and industrialization after the Civil War;
and (4) the land boom of the early 1900's. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, A PRELIMINARY RE-
PORT TO THE TAX INQUIRY COUNCIL OF FLORIDA ON THE FLORIDA FISCAL SITUATION 6-7 (1941).
27. Before the Civil War, counties were authorized to purchase stock in railroads in or-
der to stimulate Florida's transition from an agrarian pioneer society into an industrialized
society. Subsidies in the form of land grants were also offered. Most of the railroad tracks
laid before the Civil War were destroyed during the war. During the Reconstruction Era, the
state government guaranteed payment of the interest on the defaulting bonds issued by the
railroads. The Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund eventually took over the rail-
roads, sold the railroads at a loss, and settled the debts by selling four million acres of
public land at $.25 an acre. Patterson, Legal Aspects of Florida Municipal Bond Financing,
6 U. FLA. L. REV. 287, 291-92 (1953).
28. Id.; see McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, 18 CALIF. L. REv. 137, 140 (1930).
29. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XII, § 7 stated: "The Legislature shall have power to pro-
vide for issuing State bonds bearing interest, for securing the debt [of the State] and for the
erection of State buildings, support of State institutions, and perfecting public works."
The power of the legislature to issue bonds and authorize municipalities to issue bonds is
unlimited in the absence of constitutional restrictions. Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 308, 315
(Fla. 1930); Patterson, supra note 27, at 287 n.3. Before the 1868 constitution, the legisla-
ture authorized counties to issue bonds. E.g., County Comm'rs v. King, 13 Fla. 451 (1870);
Cotten v. County Comm'rs, 6 Fla. 610 (1856).
30. The state used the broad authorization of the 1868 constitution to own stock in rail-
roads and other private corporations. See supra note 27; D'Alemberte, Commentary, 26A
FLA. STAT. ANN. 197 (West 1970); see also Patterson, supra note 27, at 290-91.
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The legislature's actions precipitated the 1875 revisions to the
Florida Constitution, which more severely restricted state bond is-
suances." The 1875 amendment sought to prevent the use of the
public credit, taxing power, money, or property to assist private
enterprise.3 2 When the 1885 constitution was written, it included
even more explicit curbs on government debt financing. Article 9,
section 6 allowed state bonds to be issued only to finance the re-
pelling of an invasion or suppressing of an insurrection or for re-
funding at a lower rate bonds already issued, deliberately omitting
the broad authorization found in the 1868 constitution, even as
limited by the 1875 amendment.33
Although further restrictions on state financing were imposed
with the 1885 constitution, it contained no language regarding the
use of bond financing by municipalities other than the prohibition
against participating in a private corporation. 4 By the early 1900's,
municipalities had begun to issue bonds for a variety of purposes.3 5
31. In 1875, the constitution was amended to omit the reference to public works and add
provisions concerning the loaning of state credit. It also prohibited the state or a municipal-
ity from becoming a stockholder in a private corporation or obtaining or appropriating
money for or loaning its credit to a private entity. Art. XII, § 7, as amended, stated:
The Legislature shall have power to provide for issuing State bonds bearing inter-
est for securing the debt of the State, for the erection of State buildings, and for
the support of State institutions; but the credit of the State shall not be pledged
or loaned to any individual, company, corporation, or association; nor shall the
State become a joint owner or stockholder in any company, association, or corpo-
ration. The Legislature shall not authorize any county, city, borough, township, or
incorporated district to become a stockholder in any company, association, or cor-
poration, or to obtain or appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to, any corpo-
ration, association, institution, or individual.
32. See State v. Jacksonville Port Auth., 204 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1967); Cheney v. Jones, 14
Fla. 587 (1874).
33. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 6 stated: "The Legislature shall have power to provide
for issuing State bonds only for the purpose of repelling invasion or suppressing insurrec-
tion, or for the purpose of redeeming or refunding bonds already issued, at a lower rate of
interest." The restrictions on state bond financing were intended to " 'prevent the profligate
increase of the public burden'" and to " 'prevent the depreciation of our credit.'" In re
Advisory Opinion to Governor, 114 So. 850, 855 (Fla. 1927) (quoting Cheney v. Jones, 14
Fla. 587, 615 (1874)).
34. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 10 stated:
The credit of the State shall not be pledged or loaned to any individual, company,
corporation or association; nor shall the State become a joint owner or stock-
holder in any company, association or corporation. The Legislature shall not au-
thorize any county, city, borough, township or incorporated district to become a
stock-holder in any company, association or corporation, or to obtain or appropri-
ate money for, or to loan its credit to, any corporation, association, institution or
individual.
35. [Ojther obligations of state revenues were incurred generally through one of the
specific authorizations in the 1885 Constitution, (i.e., school bonds, gas anticipa-
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Unrestricted by the constitution, government entities again overex-
tended the public credit.36 When economic difficulties came to
Florida in the 1920's, many of these issues went into default.3 7 The
national economic crisis followed, and as the defaults mounted,
Florida responded in 1930 with an amendment to the 1885 consti-
tution which severely limited the municipalities' power to issue
bonds, unless approved by a vote of the freeholders. 8 Its goal was
" 'to lay a restraint . . . on the spend-thrift tendencies of political
subdivisions to load the future with obligations to pay for things
that the present desires, but cannot justly pay for as they go,
thereby necessitating the involvement of the public credit in some
form of funding or borrowing operation . . . .' "' Despite this re-
strictive goal, municipalities proceeded to use various subterfuges
to allow municipal debt to be created without submitting the ques-
tion of its issuance to the electorate.4 0 The Florida Supreme Court
tion certificates, etc.) or through the revenue bond concept. The Florida state
court allowed the state to build capital facilities through bonding with the bonds
repaid by "rents" paid to the agency operating the facility. This stretched the
revenue bond concept somewhat for in substance, if not in form, it obligated tax
resources of the state.
D'Alemberte, Commentary, 26A FLA. STAT. ANN. 197 (West 1970). See Patterson, supra note
27, at 294. While this approach blocked some of the wide ranging uses of general obligation
bonds, it also encouraged an evolution of the revenue bond approach.
36. Local government indebtedness skyrocketed from $110 million in 1922 to more than
$600 million in 1929. Joubert, Local Public Debt Policy in Florida: Part I, ECON. LEAFLETS,
Aug. 1944, at 1. "Local communities, determined to attract the most settlers and investors,
entered into a vicious competition to build the most elaborate public works." Id.
37. The Florida land boom and overspeculation of the early 1900's and its subsequent
collapse led to the "almost total paralysis of local government throughout the state." Currie,
Municipal Debt Adjustments in Florida, 1926-1940, 4 MUN. FIN. J. 199, 199 (1983). As the
land boom began to subside in the late 1920's, Florida was hit by two hurricanes, a fruit fly
scare, and the national economic crisis. Therefore, many persons were unable to pay the
inflated ad valorem taxes, and municipal resources were inadequate to service the public
debt. For detailed figures on the municipal indebtedness during the 1920's and 1930's, see
generally id.; Joubert, supra note 36.
Thus, the 1885 constitution was recognized as having "saved the state, but at the expense
of the localities." REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON TAXATION AND PUBLIC DEBT IN FLORIDA
149 (1935), quoted in Currie, supra, at 208 n.47.
38. The 1930 amendment provided that "the Counties, Districts or Municipalities of the
State of Florida shall have power to issue bonds only after the same shall have been ap-
proved by a majority of the votes cast in an election in which a majority of the freeholders
who are qualified electors ...shall participate .... "
39. State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 894 (Fla. 1980) (quoting Leon
County v. State, 165 So. 666, 669 (Fla. 1936)).
40. One particularly creative form of bond financing was the use of certificates of pay-
ment. The court distinguished between the power to contract for current governmental
needs based on anticipated revenues and the creation of an unauthorized debt in Tapers v.
Pichard, 169 So. 39, 40-41 (Fla. 1936). Four months earlier, the court had rejected Leon
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approved many of these devices in the years following the 1930
amendment.4 '
The broadening court decisions were apparently well received, if
not as easily well understood,42 because when the opportunity
came to revise the constitution in 1968, the language chosen was
largely a ratification of the prior judicial interpretations."3 Gone
were the restrictions of 1930, and while the 1968 constitution was
to need later refinement, 44 it liberalized bonding authority for
projects not tied to ad valorem taxes and for projects supporting
economic development.45  The current constitutional provisions
controlling bond issues are complex and thorough, but balanced. In
adopting the constitution and later amendments, however, the peo-
ple have left questions to be answered on a case-by-case basis as
County's issuance of bonds which were secured by a building tax of five mills per annum for
five consecutive years. Leon County v. State, 165 So. 666, 667 (Fla. 1936). However, the
court in Leon County left a loophole which the local governments immediately pursued.
Governments could contract for public improvements, payable in multi-year installments
and payable from specific taxes, when and if collected. Id. at 669. The plan approved in
Tapers, which expanded upon the loophole left by Leon County, allowed public officials to
impose the building tax and then use the revenues generated thereby to pay "certificates of
payment." Tapers, 169 So. at 39-40. The certificates of payment were not considered to be
"bonds," because they were issued every two weeks in settlement of the amounts owed for
labor and construction as part of the normal budgetary requirements for an essential gov-
ernmental function, i.e., constructing and maintaining a jail. Id. at 40-41. This type of finan-
cial arrangement was later specifically prohibited by the 1968 constitution and would now
require the approval of the electorate. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 11(c); see also State v.
County of Dade, 234 So. 2d 651, 653 (Fla. 1970); Mize v. County of Seminole, 229 So. 2d 841
(Fla. 1969).
41. See the court's historical discussion of the pre-1968 constitution judicial interpreta-
tions in State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 898 (Fla. 1980), and that of
commentators in Greenfield, Flexibility and Fiscal Conservatism: Provisions of the 1978
Constitutional Revision Relating to Bond Financing, 6 FLA. ST. UL. REV. 821, 823 (1978),
and Patterson, supra note 27.
42. See infra notes 60-63, 65-67, and accompanying text.
43. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 11(c).
44. See, e.g., id. art. VII, § 10, permitting the use of bonds to finance the construction
and operation of electric generating or transmission facilities (added in 1974); art. VII, § 14,
permitting the use of bonds to finance construction of pollution control facilities, solid waste
disposal facilities, and other water facilities (added in 1970 and amended in 1980); art. VII,
§ 15, permitting the use of bonds to finance loans to students at institutions of higher edu-
cation (added in 1972); art. VII, § 16, permitting the use of bonds to finance housing and
related facilities (added in 1980).
45. Id. art. VII, § 10. The revisions deleted the words "obtain or appropriate money for"
contained in FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 10. The deletion of those words is significant,
and judicial interpretations of this action opened the way for industrial development bonds
to be issued to promote economic development as long as there was no recourse to the mu-
nicipal issue and the debt service on the bonds would be met by project revenues. See Nohrr
v. Brevard County Educ. Fac. Auth., 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971); State v. Town of North
Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
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the structures of particular financings present themselves.
III. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF
REVENUE BONDS
State and local governments are permitted by the Florida Con-
stitution to incur general obligation debt, but voter approval of the
issue is required before ad valorem tax revenues may be obli-
gated."6 Continued voter involvement in general obligation bonds
reflects a concern that improvident politicians will overextend the
debt level of the state or municipalities and thus place an unrea-
sonable burden on Florida's taxpayers. 7 Municipal officials may be
inclined to shy away from submitting these questions to the voters
for political reasons, because of the time and attention required by
the referendum process or out of a desire not to increase ad
valorem taxes. In many situations, revenue bonds provide the logi-
cal alternative.
The name "revenue bond" alone does not make a revenue bond
one in fact. Regardless of the form of an obligation or what it is
called, if it pledges the ad valorem taxing power of a municipality,
an approving referendum is required in Florida for the obligation
to be valid.' 8 Consequently, the first concern is to determine the
effect of a proposed bond issue in light of the constitutional prohi-
bition against improvident spending by municipal officials. 49 A
bond issue which is secured by a promise whose "practical effect"
is to pledge the ad valorem taxing power of the municipality must
have the prior approval of the electorate."
The development of the practical effect test by the Florida
courts acknowledges the competing public policies involved. Flor-
ida case law has recognized that the current Florida Constitution is
46. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 11, 12.
47. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
48. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 12. The designation of a revenue source as a certificate of
indebtedness rather than as a bond is not sufficient to avoid the requirements of art. VII, §
12. Bonds and certificates of indebtedness are inherently alike. Both contain a promise
under seal to pay a certain sum to the purchaser. See Sullivan v. City of Tampa, 134 So.
211, 215 (Fla. 1931) (quoting Board of County Comm'rs v. Home Say. Bank, 236 U.S. 101
(1915)). The court will not defeat the intended purpose of the constitution or impair its
prohibitions by narrowly construing its terms. Sullivan, 134 So. at 216. Moreover, the 1968
revision to the constitution explicitly treats bonds and certificates of indebtedness in the
same manner. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 12. See also State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392
So. 2d 875, 897-98 (Fla. 1980).
49. State v. City of Miami, 152 So. 6, 11 (Fla. 1933).
50. Id.; see also Board of County Comm'rs v. Herrick, 167 So. 386, 393 (Fla. 1936).
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a response to past misguided use of the state's tax resources and
an attempt to regain control of the public debt by the citizens. 1
Nevertheless, the courts also seem to have recognized the need to
balance the people's intent as expressed in the Florida Constitu-
tion against the demands on government to design financing pack-
ages that will allow it to continue to properly serve a growing pop-
ulation.52  As a result, interpretations of the constitutional
limitation on the use of the public credit have evolved to a point
where municipalities are relatively unrestricted by the requirement
for voter approval even though the use of revenue bonds may have
moved into territories once thought to be solely the province of
general obligation bonds.
After determining if the "revenues" pledged to a bond issue do
not require voter approval, one must also show that the expendi-
tures serve a "public purpose. '53 As is later demonstrated, the pub-
lic purpose doctrine has followed an evolution similar to that of the
credit that may be pledged in support of a bond issue. Despite to-
day's expanded interpretations, mere indirect public benefit re-
mains insufficient to justify the use of revenue bonds. 4
A two-pronged test has therefore developed for analyzing the
constitutional ability to issue revenue bonds. Bond counsel asked
to opine on a proposed revenue bond issue must first determine
that the ad valorem taxing power of a municipality is not being
pledged, and second, determine that the project serves a requisite
public purpose. 5 A bond issue which meets both of those tests may
be successfully taken to validation by an authorized governmental
entity. 6
51. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 122-55 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
55. See Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth., 427 So. 2d 174, 178 (Fla. 1983); Wald v. Sara-
sota County Health Fac. Auth., 360 So. 2d 763, 769 (Fla. 1978).
56. Validation proceedings determine both the authority of the agency to issue the
bonds and the lawfulness of the purpose. See State v. Suwanee County Dev. Auth., 122 So.
2d 190, 193 (Fla. 1960). Validation is available for government debt financing under FLA.
STAT. §§ 75.01-.17 (1983). A complaint requesting a determination of authority to incur the
bonded debt is filed pursuant to § 75.02. The circuit court has jurisdiction of the action
under § 75.01. See generally State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 884 (Fla.
1980); Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Fac. Auth., 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971); State v. Inter-
Am. Center Auth., 84 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1955).
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A. Available Credit
If one were to ask bond counsel what credit could be used in
support of a Florida revenue bond issue today, the answer would
likely be that a municipality can pledge something less than all its
available non-ad valorem revenues. While that is one reading given
the court's opinion in County of Volusia v. State,57 the actual lan-
guage in that case and in later opinions suggests that this is not
the standard. Instead, the concern in recent Florida case law ap-
pears to be whether the nature of the pledge would force an in-
crease in ad valorem taxes.5 8 It is submitted by the authors that
the focus ought to be on the bondholders' access in the event of
default to ad valorem tax revenues in excess of those nonvoted
mills authorized under the constitution.59
The Florida Supreme Court has provided substantial guidance
on the question of when a revenue bond provision will be consid-
ered to have a direct effect on the ad valorem taxing power. Early
in its interpretation of the 1885 constitution, as amended in 1930,
the court held that bonds payable solely from revenues to be gen-
erated by the capital project did not require a referendum. 0 The
purpose of a self-liquidating project initially had to be the mainte-
nance, improvement, or extension of an existing facility.8 ' The ra-
tionale was that revenue-generating capabilities of the existing fa-
cility were known.2 The court felt that borrowing to raise capital
57. 417 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1982).
58. See infra notes 84-110 and accompanying text.
59. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b) governs the maximum millage limits which local govern-
ments may impose. It provides:
Ad valorem taxes, exclusive of taxes levied for the payment of bonds and taxes
levied for periods not longer than two years when authorized by vote of the elec-
tors who are the owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation,
shall not be levied in excess of the following millages upon the assessed value of
real estate and tangible personal property: for all county purposes, ten mills; for
all municipal purposes, ten mills; for all school purposes, ten mills;. . . and for all
other special districts a millage authorized by law approved by vote of the electors
who are owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation. A county
furnishing municipal services may, to the extent authorized by law, levy additional
taxes within the limits fixed for municipal purposes.
60. See State v. City of Miami, 152 So. 6, 12 (Fla. 1933).
61. See, e.g., State v. City of Tampa, 3 So. 2d 484, 485-86 (Fla. 1941); Williams v. Town
of Dunnellon, 169 So. 631, 635 (Fla. 1936); State v. City of Daytona Beach, 158 So. 300 (Fla.
1934).
62. See State v. City of Miami, 152 So. 6 (Fla. 1933). Moreover, since the certificates
being issued were payable solely from revenues generated by the facility, they were held not
to be obligations of the municipality, and, therefore, did not require a referendum. The
effect was to allow the financing of water system improvements under the rationalization
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for operating utilities, secured only by a pledge of anticipated reve-
nues, was not among the evils which the constitutional require-
ment was designed to prevent.63
As pressures grew to finance outside the referendum process, the
court expanded the permissible uses of revenue bonds to include
financing the construction of new facilities, as long as the only
credit pledged was the revenue generated by the project itself."
Reasoning that the bondholders would not have access to the tax-
ing power of the municipality if the revenues generated by the fa-
cility were insufficient to pay the debt, the court in Board of
County Commissioners v. Herrick8 held that bonds issued to fi-
nance self-liquidating projects were not general obligation bonds
within the meaning of the constitutional limitations either in law
or in fact.6 Therefore, no referendum was required for bonds se-
cured solely by project-generated revenue.6 7 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court simply ignored its prior emphasis on examining
the known capacity of an existing facility to generate sufficient rev-
enue to service the bonds.
Through the time of the constitutional revision in 1968, the
court continued to expand the concept of revenue bond financing.
In State v. City of Winter Park,6 8 the court upheld sewer revenue
that the taxpayers had not been obligated. The court emphasized that the municipality had
a primary obligation to provide a water system for its citizens. Sufficient authority existed to
justify the use of this method of financing without prior electorate approval. But see Boykin
v. Town of River Junction, 164 So. 558, 561 (Fla. 1935), in which the utility purchase was
secured by revenues and by a mortgage, and the court concluded that the mortgage could
give rise to an eventual municipal obligation to redeem the mortgage if there were a
foreclosure.
63. City of Miami, 152 So. at 11-12.
64. See, e.g., City of Miami, 72 So. 2d at 656; State v. City of Key West, 14 So. 2d 707,
708 (Fla. 1943); Board of County Comm'rs v. Herrick, 167 So. 386 (Fla. 1936). In the early
stages of the expansion of this doctrine, the court approved the issuance of bonds for the
construction of a new bridge payable from the receipts from tolls of an existing bridge. See
Flint v. Duval County, 170 So. 587 (Fla. 1936). In Flint, the net receipts from tolls on an
existing bridge were tax resources and were not considered a pledge of the public credit.
Although recognized as a new project, the court emphasized the relationship between the
new bridge and the existing self-liquidating highway bridge. Id. at 597.
65. 167 So. 386 (Fla. 1936).
66. Id. at 393-94.
67. Id. at 394. The critical element is whether the taxing power or credit of the munici-
pality is pledged. As long as the bonds are payable solely from the net revenues of the
project, the bondholders have no recourse if the revenues are insufficient to pay the bonds.
Therefore, no public credit is pledged. Id.; see City of Key West, 14 So. 2d at 708. See also
State v. Halifax Hosp. Dist., 159 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1963), as to the court's treatment of a
pledge of gross revenues.
68. 34 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1948).
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bonds which were payable from the revenues of the facility aug-
mented by the net proceeds of a utility service tax. The pledge of
excise taxes in addition to revenue generated by the project was
considered not to be a pledge of the full faith and credit of the
municipality and, therefore, was held to be permissible without a
referendum." The court reasoned that a utility service tax was
"derived from the proceeds of the utility" and was entitled to the
same justifications as the self-liquidating revenue bond.70 Public
officials were, therefore, thought to be within the scope of their au-
thority when they promulgated the tax, as the bondholders were
still not in a position to compel the exercise of the municipality's
taxing power on real or personal property in the event of a
default.7
1
The legislature later enacted section 184.21 (now section 159.19),
Florida Statutes,72 which states in pertinent part:
Any municipality may pledge the proceeds of utilities service
taxes, cigarette taxes, or franchise taxes, as defined herein, or any
other excise taxes or other funds which such municipality is au-
thorized to levy and collect or will have available, as additional
security for the payment of the principal of or interest on any
revenue bonds or general obligation bonds issued hereunder or for
reserves for such debt service.73
Without clearly explaining its rationale, the court in Klein v. City
of New Smyrna Beach7 4 accepted section 184.21 as a sufficient au-
thorization for validating bonds secured by any excise taxes, spe-
cial assessments, or charges against the facility constructed with-
out electorate approval as long as no ad valorem taxes were
pledged.75 In so ruling, the court in Klein ignored the requirement
imposed in City of Winter Park that the tax in some way be de-
rived from the proceeds of the project itself.
The court has now recognized and approved a variety of tax re-
sources to support revenue bond issues. Utility franchise taxes or
69. Id. at 741.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Ch. 59-361, § 8, 1959 Fla. Laws 1257, 1262-63 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 159.19
(1983)).
73. Id.
74. 152 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1963).
75. Id. at 467-68; see also State v. Board of Pub. Instr., 214 So. 2d 723, 724 (Fla. 1968)
("[N]o election.., is necessary if the certificates of indebtedness or revenue certificates are
payable from excise taxes or sources other than ad valorem taxes.").
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user fees were early sources of support for revenue bonds."6 The
court has also approved the pledge of special assessments against
specific properties to be benefited by the project,77 cigarette
taxes,78 motor vehicle license taxes,79 gas taxes,8 0 and racetrack and
jail funds.8 " By implication, the court in Welker v. State8 2 ap-
proved the pledge of any revenue source except ad valorem taxes.
The court stated that "a pledge of excise tax income with a simul-
taneous prohibition against an ad valorem levy does not necessi-
tate a precedent expression of the freeholders of the issuing
authority."'8 3
Once alternative revenue sources were found not to have a direct
effect on the ad valorem taxing power and were therefore available
as security for a bond, the difficult question arose of whether the
pledge of non-ad valorem revenues might have the indirect effect
of forcing an increase in ad valorem taxes in order to pay for ser-
vices which were being supported by the pledged excise revenues.
Thus, the court developed the "incidental effect" test. In Town of
Medley v. State,4 the town proposed pledging a variety of revenue
sources to secure payment of the public improvement revenue
bonds being issued. These included the proposed water system
proceeds, revenues from the cigarette tax, a franchise tax on elec-
tric power, utility taxes, and an occupational license tax. 5 Since no
ad valorem taxes were pledged, the bonds did not directly pledge
public credit and were not immediately within the purview of the
constitutional restriction. The court was, however, forced to ex-
amine the implications such a widespread pledge of available re-
sources would have on the ad valorem taxing power of the town. 6
In any instance in which a municipality has been using funds
76. See, e.g., Miller v. City of St. Augustine, 97 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1957); State v. City of
Pompano Beach, 47 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1950); Schmeller v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 38 So. 2d
36 (Fla. 1948).
77. See, e.g., Klein v. City of New Smyrna Beach, 152 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1963).
78. See, e.g., id.; Welker v. State, 93 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1957).
79. See, e.g., State v. Board of Pub. Instr., 214 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1968).
80. State v. Division of Bond Fin., 246 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1971).
81. State v. Orange County, 281 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1973).
82. 93 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1957).
83. Id. at 593.
84. 162 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1964).
85. Id. Moreover, the authorizing ordinance specifically stated that the town was not
either directly or indirectly obligated to levy ad valorem taxes for payment of the bonds. Id.
at 257-58.
86. Id. at 258.
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from special non-ad valorem sources of revenue to meet its oper-
ating costs and then diverts those funds by pledging them to pay-
ment of a specific indebtedness . . . , the result will probably be
that ad valorem taxes will have to be increased to make up the
deficiency in funds available for operating expenses."s
Nevertheless, that result did not automatically make the bonds
subject to the constitutional referendum requirement. "The inci-
dental effect on use of the ad valorem taxing power occasioned by
the pledging of other sources of revenue does not subject such
bonds or certificates to [the] constitutional requirement." ' The
court stated that only bonds which directly obligate the ad valorem
taxing power were subject to the constitutional referendum
requirement."9
Governmental entities were therefore provided wide latitude in
their search for revenues outside of the project with which to en-
hance the credit of a revenue bond issue. The court has gone so far
as to approve a general pledge of "other funds except ad valorem
taxes" in the event the excise taxes are not sufficient to service the
bonds and operate the facility."0
Controversy has arisen concerning the ability of a revenue bond
issue to include a pledge of all non-ad valorem revenues.91 In
County of Volusia v. State,9 2 the court refused to validate capital
improvement bonds for the construction of a new jail which were
secured by a pledge of all legally available, unencumbered revenues
of the county other than ad valorem taxes, and by a further pledge
to maintain the programs and projects from which the unencum-
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also State v. Alachua County, 335 So. 2d 554, 558 (Fla. 1976).
89. Town of Medley, 162 So. 2d at 258. The court, however, has consistently refused to
allow a municipality to secure a bond with a mortgage. See, e.g., Broward County Port
Auth. v. State, 175 So. 796 (Fla. 1937); State v. City of Daytona Beach, 158 So. 300 (Fla.
1934). In Boykin v. Town of River Junction, 164 So. 558 (Fla. 1935), the court reasoned that
the practical effect of the mortgage on the physical property of the utility was to create a
situation in which the bondholder could compel the exercise of the taxing power in the
event of a foreclosure to prevent the loss of the mortgaged assets. The court continues to
hold, without deviation, that a revenue bond which is secured by a mortgage requires a
referendum as it is a pledge of the full faith and credit of the municipality. State v. Miami
Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 896 (Fla. 1980); Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Fac.
Auth., 247 So. 2d 304, 310-11 (Fla. 1971).
90. See State v. City of Coral Gables, 72 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1954).
91. Compare County of Volusia v. State, 417 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1982) (bonds pledging all
available sources not validated), with City of Palatka v. State, 440 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1983)
(bonds pledging two specific revenues, not all revenues, validated).
92. 417 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1982).
19851
718 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:701
bered revenues were derived.9 3 According to the court, the practi-
cal effect of such a pledge was to require increased ad valorem
taxes.94 The court reasoned that:
To maintain all of the programs that produce the revenues, while
devoting the revenues themselves to the retirement of the bonds,
will inevitably require that ad valorem taxes be increased so that
the county will have sufficient operating revenue to maintain the
programs and services that generate the pledged revenues.5
Since a general pledge of all available non-ad valorem revenues
was thought to have more than a mere incidental effect on the ad
valorem taxing power of a municipality, a referendum was re-
quired.9 6 The court further stated: "[T]hat which may not be done
directly may not be done indirectly.
97
In 1983, City of Palatka v. State9 provided the court with an-
other opportunity to examine the incidental effect test. The city
sought to issue bonds secured by water and sewer revenues and
utility taxes in order to finance the construction of a new sewage
treatment plant and to refund prior bonds.99 The court stated that
the mere possibility of decreased available revenues, which in turn
might necessitate the levy of additional ad valorem taxes, did not
invoke the constitutional referendum requirement. 00 The court
factually distinguished County of Volusia on the grounds that, in
City of Palatka, only two specific revenue sources were pledged, 101
and the city had only covenanted to maintain the taxes at a suffi-
cient level to pay the bonds.1 0 2
93. Id. at 969. In addition, the county covenanted to do everything necessary to continue
receiving the revenues as security for the bonds.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 971.
96. Id.
While the county has not directly pledged ad valorem taxes to the payment of the
bonds, its pledge of all other available revenues, together with its promise to do all
things necessary to continue to receive the various revenues, will inevitably lead to
higher ad valorem taxes during the life of the bonds, which amounts to the same
thing.
Id. at 972. See also State v. Halifax Hosp. Dist., 159 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1963).
97. County of Volusia, 417 So. 2d at 972.
98. 440 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1983).
99. Id. at 1272.
100. Id. at 1273.
101. Id. at 1272.
102. Id. at 1273. The lower court made a finding that the revenues pledged constituted
approximately 80% of the total revenues, except ad valorem taxes, available to the city.
However, during oral arguments and in its brief, the appellee conceded that the correct
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Another "incidental effect" concern may arise from a pledge by
government to make up deficits in the operating budget of the fa-
cility being financed with revenue bonds if the revenues are not
sufficient to pay the debt service and operate the facility.10 3 In
State v. City of West Palm Beach,04 bonds were issued to finance
an off-street parking garage. The proceeds from the facility and
on-street parking meters were to be applied first to the payment of
the interest and principal of the bonds with any remaining funds
to be used for operating expenses of the project. The city simulta-
neously pledged to make up any deficit in the operating expenses
of the project from all non-ad valorem revenue sources.0 5 By im-
plication, 100% of the revenues of the project could be required for
payment of the bond obligation, leaving the city responsible for the
entire cost of operating the project. If the project-generated reve-
nues were insufficient to meet debt service on the bonds, however,
the bond documents provided that the bondholders would have no
recourse to compel payment by the municipality. The court found
that this arrangement would produce merely a possible incidental
effect on the city's ad valorem taxing power, and therefore, was not
subject to the constitutional referendum requirement. 06
In State v. Halifax Hospital District,'° the court rejected a
bond issue which pledged the gross revenues of the facility for pay-
ment because the bond resolution also committed revenues of a
current four-mill ad valorem levy to operate and maintain the fa-
cility for the life of the bonds. 08 In addition, the hospital district
figure was 49% of non-ad valorem tax revenues. Id. at 1272. The supreme court stated:
This situation does not fall within the purview of the County of Volusia, in which
this Court reasoned that the only way Volusia County would be able to uphold its
covenant to maintain the programs which generated all of its non-ad valorem rev-
enues would be to raise ad valorem taxes to operate such programs.
Id. at 1273 (emphasis added). See also State v. City of Daytona Beach, 431 So. 2d 981, 983
(Fla. 1983).
103. See, e.g., State v. Inter-Am. Center Auth., 281 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1973); State v. Hali-
fax Hosp. Dist., 159 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1963); Sanibel-Captiva Taxpayers' Ass'n v. County of
Lee, 132 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1961); State v. City of West Palm Beach, 125 So. 2d 568 (Fla.
1960).
104. 125 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1960).
105. Id. at 571.
106. Id. Of significance was the chancellor's finding that the city would not be obligated
for the payment of the bonds themselves. The city was not indirectly, directly, or contin-
gently liable for the obligation. No public credit was pledged and, therefore, there was no
general obligation of the city resting upon the pledge of its full faith and credit. See also
State v. Alachua County, 335 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1976).
107. 159 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1963).
108. Id. at 235.
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pledged to continue collecting the four-mill ad valorem levy
throughout the life of the bonds. The court refused to allow the
form of the levy, i.e., a "special assessment," to disguise the true
nature of the obligation. In the court's view, a pledge of the gross
revenues in this instance would necessitate the levy of ad valorem
taxes to operate the project and was therefore thought to be a
mere pretense designed to circumvent the referendum
requirement."°9
The court's distinction, however, seems largely fictional. Since
the ad valorem millage was already in place, the burden on the
taxpayer was not increased by a pledge to continue to collect the
levy. Moreover, a municipality can pledge to make up potential
deficits in the operating budget of a facility if the revenue sources
are insufficient to both service the debt and meet operating costs
as in State v. City of West Palm Beach.110 The effect on the an-
nual operating budget of a municipality is no different under the
Halifax situation from that in City of West Palm Beach, unless
the municipality has no non-ad valorem revenue source. It would
appear that the "incidental effect" test was incorrectly applied in
Halifax.
If there is to be an "incidental effect" test in Florida, it can be
better rationalized in light of its application in County of Volusia
v. State,"' where programs supported by pledged user fees were to
be continued notwithstanding the possible necessity of using these
fees to meet the debt service on the jail. Volusia County had
pledged all legally unencumbered revenues, including regulatory
fees and user charges." 2 A county park, for example, might have
generated revenues from user charges, but all of those revenues
were pledged to support debt service on the jail. The only way to
meet the promise to maintain the county park so that revenues
from user charges would continue would be to tap ad valorem tax
revenues, since any increase in user charges would still be pledged
to debt service on the jail. County park maintenance would clearly
be an ongoing expense which under the covenant to maintain oper-
ations would have to be supported by ad valorem tax revenues.
Under the County of Volusia rationale, the court's concern
seems to be with a government pledge of all non-ad valorem tax
revenues in support of debt incurred on a capital project, together
109. Id.
110. 125 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1960).
111. 417 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1982).
112. Id. at 970.
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with a covenant to maintain the programs and projects that gener-
ate those revenues. This is evidenced by the court's statement in
City of Palatka v. State:" 3 "[In County of Volusia] this Court rea-
soned that the only way Volusia County would be able to uphold
its covenant to maintain the programs which generated all of its
non-ad valorem revenues would be to raise ad valorem taxes to op-
erate such programs."'" 4
Cases subsequent to County of Volusia further illustrate this
concern. In Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Jacksonville Electric
Authority,"5 the City of Jacksonville pledged its non-ad valorem
revenues from the Jacksonville Electric Authority (JEA) in sup-
port of a bond issue for the Authority. The record showed that
JEA's rates had been set at a level to allow a contribution to the
city of six to seven percent of the JEA revenues. The possibility
that the city might not receive this annual contribution was char-
acterized as having a merely incidental effect on the city's exercise
of its ad valorem taxing power: "The situation does not even begin
to approach the actual compulsion to increase ad valorem taxes
which we found in County of Volusia v. State." 6
In State v. City of Daytona Beach," 7 the city pledged revenue
sharing funds and franchise fees received from Florida Power &
Light Company in support of bonds for its civic and convention
center. The court again found the effect on ad valorem taxation to
be incidental and distinguished County of Volusia: "We have held
such a pledge to be a promise to levy ad valorem taxes only when
the record clearly reflects that all legally available non-ad valorem
revenue sources have been pledged and the governmental body has
agreed to do everything necessary to receive such revenue."" 8 City
of Palatka, similarly, pledged only two specific revenue sources
and contained no covenant to maintain the facility generating the
revenues.
Under the County of Volusia rationale, the troubling features of
a revenue bond issue are a pledge of all non-ad valorem revenues
in combination with a covenant to maintain the programs or
projects which are producing those revenues. If only certain spe-
cific revenue sources are pledged, the potential effect on the gov-
113. 440 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1983).
114. Id. at 1273.
115. 419 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1982).
116. Id. at 1094.
117. 431 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1983).
118. Id. at 983 (emphasis in original).
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ernment's ad valorem needs do not become a concern, because the
government is free to raise additional non-ad valorem revenues
from other sources without a vote of the people to fund items in its
operating budget. The covenant to maintain becomes significant to
the court only if the pledged revenue sources are general rather
than specific. A general pledge of all non-ad valorem revenues to-
gether with a covenant to maintain those services arguably re-
quires ad valorem tax revenues to be the source of funds for
projects and programs that were being funded by non-ad valorem
revenues; it follows that this drain on ad valorem revenues may be
large enough that greater ad valorem revenues will be needed to
meet operating needs of those projects which are covered by the
covenant to maintain.
County of Volusia and its progeny ignore the important point
that no inherent obligation to increase ad valorem taxation neces-
sarily follows from the promise to use ad valorem taxes to maintain
those programs which are currently producing regulatory fees and
user charges. A county is, for example, authorized to levy ten mills
"for all county purposes" without seeking voter approval.119 Within
this ten-mill limitation, the county might simply reduce services in
one area or another not covered by the covenant in order to accom-
modate the loss of regulatory fees and user charges to support ser-
vices in still another area. The government need only make the
political judgment to reduce service in one area, if necessary, to
meet its annual operating obligations without increasing ad
valorem tax revenues.
The proper analysis, however, should not be on the speculative
impact on ad valorem taxes, but rather on the bondholders' reme-
dies. The principle has been clearly stated from the outset by the
court and the Florida Constitution that ad valorem tax revenues
may not be pledged without an approving referendum. Since in
County of Volusia, City of Palatka, Jacksonville Shipyards, and
City of Daytona Beach, there were not approving referenda in sup-
port of the bond issues, the bondholders were entitled to look only
to project revenues and whatever non-ad valorem revenues were
pledged in support of the projects. The analysis therefore should
simply be directed towards what revenue sources the bondholders
have access to in order to satisfy debt service obligations. 120 Cur-
119. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b).
120. See, e.g., Broward County Port Auth. v. State, 175 So. 796, 801 (Fla. 1937); Boykin
v. Town of River Junction, 164 So. 558 (Fla. 1935).
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rent ad valorem tax revenues may be drawn on only to the extent
that the municipality's governing body makes a political decision
to apportion those revenues.
If additional money were needed to meet debt service, public of-
ficials would be left to exercise one of several political choices. The
governing board might simply determine to reduce services rather
than ask for increased taxes. If the board seeks to increase ad
valorem taxes, a referendum must be held; if the voters reject in-
creased ad valorem taxation, the bondholders would continue to be
left to project revenues enhanced by whatever was available from
the previously pledged non-ad valorem tax sources. This would
carry out the principle that only direct obligation of the ad
valorem tax revenues require voter approval.12" '
B. Public Purpose
The limitation that Florida bond financings be for a public, not
private, purpose first appeared in the 1875 amendments to the
1868 constitution. 22 When the court began to apply the public
purpose requirement in the 1930's, it allowed bonds to be issued
for essential governmental functions, such as for building a jail,'2 3
or facilitating local public ownership and operation of public
utilities. 24
The definition of an essential function expanded due to the
court's awareness that the purpose of the constitutional prohibi-
tion against lending the public credit for the benefit of a private
enterprise was not intended to hamper the ordinary powers of pub-
lic authorities to provide for current governmental needs and re-
quirements.12 5 Once the court began to expand the concept of a
public purpose, a variety of projects became eligible for revenue
bond financing. The court eventually concluded that if the public
purpose of the project were paramount, merely incidental private
benefit flowing from the project would not be sufficient to defeat
it.' 2 ' This interpretation went beyond the literal wording of the
121. Town of Medley v. State, 162 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1964).
122. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 7 (1875). The purpose of the amendment was to
preclude the use of the public credit by private entities. State v. Jacksonville Port Auth.,
204 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 1967).
123. See, e.g., Leon County v. State, 165 So. 666 (Fla. 1936).
124. See, e.g., Williams v. Town of Dunnellon, 169 So. 631 (Fla. 1936); State v. City of
Miami, 152 So. 6 (Fla. 1933).
125. See Leon County, 165 So. at 669.
126. See State v. Board of Control, 66 So. 2d 209, 210-11 (Fla. 1953); Gate City Garage,
Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1953).
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Florida Constitution, 2 7 but it was consistent with the underlying
intent of protecting future taxpayers from a repetition of the un-
due burdens caused by the speculative excess associated with ear-
lier years.128
The requirement that a project financed with revenue bonds
have a public purpose retains current application. Even though the
amendments to the constitution have dramatically increased the
types of projects for which public funding is available,12 and the
scope and nature of the "public purpose" doctrine has evolved over
time, 30 the validity of a proposed bond issue pledging the public
credit for a project not enumerated in the Florida Constitution still
depends on whether the project serves a paramount public
purpose.13 1
The paramount public purpose doctrine is designed to "protect
public funds and resources from being exploited in assisting or
promoting private ventures when the public would be at most only
incidentally benefited.' 1 32 Projects devoted entirely to traditional
public functions should easily fulfill the public purpose require-
ment. The supreme court is aided in making the public purpose
determination by legislative provisions identifying the types of
projects which typically fulfill this requirement. 133 Trouble seems
127. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10, prohibits the lending of credit to any corporation, associ-
ation, partnership, or person, subject to listed exceptions.
128. See State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 894 (Fla. 1980).
129. With the 1968 constitution, Florida joined the national trend in bond financing and
approved the use of industrial development bonds. Article VII, § 10(c) of the 1968 constitu-
tion authorizes bonds to be issued for private industrial or manufacturing plants. A bond
which is for a private purpose may still be constitutional if it meets the requirements of art.
VII, § 10(c). If the governmental entity is only a conduit for financing a project of a private
entity, as it is in the true industrial development bond context, the public purpose analysis
remains relevant but does not necessarily involve the element of public credit. See, e.g.,
Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth. v. State, 427 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1983). For a general over-
view of industrial development bonds and their uses in Florida, see Scholl & Jimenez, The
Florida Industrial Development Bond Financing Act: The Need for Judicial Consistency,
12 FLA. ST. UL. RaV. 31 (1984).
130. "What constitutes a county purpose is not static and inflexible." State v. Monroe
County, 3 So. 2d 754, 756 (Fla. 1941). See also Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So.
2d 451 (Fla. 1975); Schmeller v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 38 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1948).
131. See State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1980).
132. Bannon v. Port of Palm Beach Dist., 246 So. 2d 737, 741 (Fla. 1971); see also Lin-
scott v. Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth., 443 So. 2d 97, 101 (Fla. 1983); Bailey v. City of
Tampa, 111 So. 119, 120 (Fla. 1926).
133. See, e.g., Florida Industrial Development Financing Act, ch. 80-287, 1980 Fla. Laws
1228 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 159.25-.431 (1983)). While this portion of ch. 159 deals
only with industrial development bonds, it is submitted that the legislative determinations
as to which types of facilities serve public purposes ought to have significant impact upon
the public purpose issue in the revenue bond context.
FLORIDA REVENUE BONDS
to arise, however, with what might be called "mixed-use" projects
from which private enterprises may derive some benefit and for
which public revenues are to some degree pledged. Such mixed-use
projects are becoming increasingly more common. Today, one may
find that as a practical matter the public need is first determined
by a political body, and the private entity is then enlisted to facili-
tate the successful completion of the project.
In Panama City v. State,134 for example, the city proposed to
issue bonds for a waterfront development project which contained
both public facilities and private shops. The project was to consist
of the Panama City Marina and the St. Andrew Marina. The Pan-
ama City Marina contained a city hall, civic auditorium, two con-
cessions buildings, an administration building, and a marine sales
and service building. The St. Andrew Marina contained a conces-
sions building, a marine sales and service building, and an admin-
istration building. Both of the marinas included docks, docking fa-
cilities, waterways, parking areas, and necessary utilities.'35 The
court deemed it unnecessary to question the public purpose of the
facilities which were traditional public buildings.' Approximately
twenty percent of the revenue pledged to the bonds was to come
from the concessions buildings which consisted of retail and service
shops. Pledged in support of the bonds were project revenues, ex-
cise tax revenues from sales of cigarettes and utility services, and
license and franchise taxes. The court stated that when the pri-
mary improvement is clearly authorized as serving a public pur-
pose, any incidental private benefit which accrues merely as an ad-
junct to the eligible facility is not prohibited.3 " It reasoned that an
incidental private benefit is not sufficient to destroy the public na-
ture of the overall plan'38 and therefore held that the financing of
private shops as a part of the Panama City plan did not take away
from the paramount public purpose for the financing.' 39
Two years later, however, the court in City of West Palm Beach
v. State 40 found that private use and benefit dominated the pro-
posed revenue bond financing of a civic center and marina which
134. 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957).
135. Id. at 610.
136. Id. at 612.
137. Id. at 613-14. The court refused to attach significance to a mere "appendage." See
also Gate City Garage, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1953), where the court
first developed this exception to the public purpose requirement.
138. Panama City, 93 So. 2d at 613-14.
139. Id. at 614.
140. 113 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1959).
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would have adjacent thereto a restaurant, stores, offstreet parking,
artificial beaches, a swimming pool, and a fuel station. To the ex-
tent revenues were insufficient to meet debt service, utility service
tax revenues were pledged as a supplemental source of funds. Of
significance to the court was the fact that the civic center itself was
to be leased to a private corporation with all adjacent facilities
solely benefiting private enterprises. 41 Moreover, the lease of the
civic center would surrender all control of the facility to the
lessee. 142 According to the court, not only was the civic center itself
questionable in its public purpose, but the close proximity of the
project to the West Palm Beach business district brought into
question the necessity for appurtenant private enterprises. 4 3 Thus,
the project was found to amount to an "improper subsidy of pri-
vate enterprise with public money.' 1 44
One distinguishing feature in determining if the benefited pri-
vate facility is considered incidental to an eligible project appears
to be the existence of a preexisting public need. In Baycol, Inc. v.
Downtown Development Authority, 45 a major section of down-
town Fort Lauderdale was to be destroyed to vacate land on which
a parking facility, financed with voter-approved bonds, was to be
erected; the facility was to serve a shopping mall to be built on top
of the parking facility. The court in Baycol reasoned that the pri-
vate project was generating the need for the public parking facility.
Thus, the parking facility, although otherwise serving a public pur-
pose, was merely incidental to the private purpose of constructing
a shopping center.146
Just a few years later, however, in State v. City of Miami,147 a
bond issue to finance construction of a parking facility integrated
with a convention center, hotel, and retail shops was found to have
a public purpose. 48 The court accepted the testimony that the fa-
cility would provide a forum for educational, civic, and commercial
141. Id. at 375-76.
142. Id. at 378. But see State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Fac. Dist., 89 So.
2d 34 (Fla. 1956). In Daytona Beach, the court upheld the finding of a public purpose for
the construction of a racetrack which was leased to private enterprises for a substantial part
of the year. Emphasis was placed upon the importance of recreational facilities in the pro-
motion of tourism which justified a holding that the public purpose predominated over the
private benefit. Id. at 37; see also State v. Escambia County, 52 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1951).
143. City of West Palm Beach, 113 So. 2d at 377.
144. Id.
145. 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975).
146. Id. at 454; cf. City of Naples v. Moon, 269 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1972).
147. 379 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1980).
148. Id. at 653.
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activities as well as increase tourism and international trade-all
legitimate public purposes. 1 9 Baycol was distinguished:
In Baycol, revenue bonds were sought to be issued to finance a
public packing facility. The air rights above the facility were to be
leased to a private developer for the construction of a shopping
center. Finding that the need for the parking facility would only
arise after completion of the shopping center, this Court refused
to validate the bonds. In the instant case, however, there was an
existing need and justification for the convention center-garage
long before the contemplation of a hotel and retail area. The vot-
ers had approved this facility in 1964, and the City at that time
did not contemplate the involvement of either the University or
the developer. It is clear that the City's dominant interest has
continually been the construction of the convention center-ga-
rage, and the lease of property by the City [for the hotel and re-
tail space] is only incidental to the paramount public purpose.8 0
In weighing the degree of private benefit, the focus has been on
the actual purpose and use of the project. One method used by the
court to measure whether the public purpose predominates over
the private benefit has been to examine the proportionate use to be
made of the facilities by the public and private sectors. A bond
issue to finance the construction of port facilities was found to be
invalid in State v. Manatee County Port Authority.1 5 1 The project
was to include a phosphate loading facility and two railroads which
would be leased to a private company. The record indicated that
the private enterprise would use sixty percent of the land to be
acquired and ninety-eight percent of the improved land. 52 The
project was therefore thought to be a private enterprise operating
under the guise of a public facility. 153 The broad general public
purpose of economic development of the area, no matter how laud-
able, would not sustain a private project when public funds were
being used to assist and enhance private enterprise. 1" As a result
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 193 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1966).
152. Id. at 163. A relatively small space adjacent to the private facility would be availa-
ble for the handling of general cargo.
153. Id. at 164; cf. Panama City, 93 So. 2d at 611 (public purpose since private conces-
sions would occupy only 1.22% of the total area with only 20% of the revenues to be de-
rived from the rents).
154. Manatee County Port Auth., 193 So. 2d at 164; see also Orange County Indus. Dev.
Auth. v. State, 427 So. 2d 174, 179 (Fla. 1983); cf. State v. City of Jacksonville, 50 So. 2d 532
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of the Manatee County Port Authority decision, not only must the
private benefit be considered an adjunct of and necessary to the
success of the public facility, the actual use of the physical struc-
ture must not be dominated by private enterprise.
Proportionality ought to have little place in determining public
purpose, however. A proportionality analysis inevitably leads to
the question of how much is too much. The question instead ought
to be whether a public goal is being served even if there is some
indirect benefit to private individuals. If, for example, a toll bridge
from the mainland to an island were to be financed by revenue
bonds, the bridge would have the effect of benefiting the private
landowners on the island. Nevertheless, legitimate reasons of pub-
lic safety and public welfare should provide a valid public purpose
to the project. Those legitimate reasons ought to end the analysis,
without consideration of the extent of the private benefit of the
improvement.
An element of flexibility runs through the court decisions in the
paramount public purpose area, which should encourage munici-
palities to create innovative financing packages for the court's re-
view. The analysis should focus on whether a public goal is being
served, even if the municipality needs private entities to carry out
the project.
Now that Congress has limited the availability of industrial de-
velopment bond financing, 55 joint ventures between governmental
entities and private developers in which part of the project is fi-
nanced with a revenue bond issue may well become more common
if community development is to continue in Florida. The court will
have to struggle with its paramount public purpose analysis to en-
sure that private enterprise is induced to participate in publicly
generated projects, when the underlying interest evidenced by the
project does indeed serve the public purpose.
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the Florida Consti-
tution, as currently interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court,
gives sufficient latitude to the Florida legislature to enable munici-
palities to structure public purpose projects which interface with
private sector entrepreneurs. Indeed, the legislature has demon-
(Fla. 1951) (municipal ownership of the radio station justifies the finding of a paramount
public purpose which will be lacking if owned by private party).
155. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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strated a willingness to extend public officials similar flexibility. It
has used the authority granted to it under the constitution, as in-
terpreted by the Florida Supreme Court, to expand the areas in
which revenue bonds may be issued. The Florida Revenue Bond
Act permits local governments to finance bridges, causeways, wa-
terworks systems, sewer systems, marinas, civic auditoriums, sports
arenas, parking facilities, and solid waste disposal systems.156
Health facilities authorities are authorized to issue revenue bonds
to finance a wide variety of public health services. 157 In addition,
jails, city office buildings, police stations, or other buildings serving
municipal functions may be financed with revenue bonds issued by
county authorities. 158
The court accords a presumption of validity to a legislative find-
ing that a certain project serves a public purpose. The court will
reject the legislative finding only if the finding is shown to be
"clearly erroneous."159 A subsequent legislative determination of a
public purpose can overcome a prior judicial decision categorizing
the same type of project as providing a private benefit. 60 The
court considers the impact of the legislative definition of public
purpose to be significant, because of the evidence available to the
legislature in making its findings.''
The legislature has also provided for flexibility in structuring the
financing terms of bond issues. The question of the interest rate on
the bonds provides a good example of that flexibility. The court
has recognized the municipality's broad discretionary power to set
interest rates. In State v. Southeast Volusia Hospital District,6 2
for example, the electorate approved the issuance of bonds bearing
interest "at such rate or rates not exceeding the legal rate as shall
be determined at the time of the sale."' 63 At the time of the elec-
tion the maximum legal rate had been 6%. Subsequent to the
bond election, the maximum legal rate was raised to 7.5% and the
156. Revenue Bond Act of 1953, ch. 28045, 1953 Fla. Laws 183 (current version at FLA.
STAT. §§ 159.01-.19 (1983)).
157. FLA. STAT. § 154.219 (1983).
158. Id. § 125.013. Although a jail is not specifically included within the definition of
"project" contained in § 125.011, the court has expanded the permissible uses of revenue
bonds beyond the projects listed by the legislature. See, e.g., County of Volusia v. State, 417
So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1982); Speer v. Olson, 367 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1978).
159. Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Fac. Auth., 247 So. 2d 304, 309 (Fla. 1971); State v.
Ocean Highway & Port Auth., 217 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. 1968).
160. Ocean Highway, 217 So. 2d at 105.
161. Nohrr, 247 So. 2d at 309; Ocean Highway, 217 So. 2d at 106.
162. 238 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1970).
163. Id. at 104.
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city officials raised the interest rate on unissued bonds to 7.5%.
The court held that the officials acted within their discretionary
power and the interest rate was, therefore, valid. The bonds were
"subject to a change in the maximum interest rate until the time
when they were sold.' 164 The same argument can be used to justify
a floating rate. As long as the notes do not exceed the maximum
rate at the time they are sold, it is within the discretion of the
municipal authority to continuously change the rate on unsold
notes. Further, the authority could adopt a formula for determin-
ing a floating rate and delegate the determination of the actual
rate based on that formula to a remarketing agent."s5
Bonds may be sold at a discount.' e "Zero bonds" may be used
on which no interest is paid, but which are sold at a price that
effectively incorporates a compounded interest rate.1 7 Bonds may
be sold through public bidding or through a negotiated sale.6 8
Terms of the issue may be set within the discretion of the issuing
entity. 69 The issuing body enjoys a similar discretion in determin-
ing costs of issuance.' 7 0
Questions may remain, however, as to how these principles will
operate in practice in response to future financing needs. Two situ-
ations that might easily arise in a Florida municipality today are
the development of an industrial park and the construction of
tourist facilities which include a convention center, hotel, and
164. Id. (emphasis in original).
165. See, e.g., Holloway v. Lakeland Downtown Dev. Auth., 417 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1982),
which said that FLA. STAT. § 215.84 was intended to give municipalities broad discretion to
set interest rates at competitive levels. Holloway, 417 So. 2d at 966. This section permits
bonds to bear interest "at a rate not to exceed an average net interest cost rate, which shall
be computed by adding 150 basis points to the 20 'bond-buyer' Average Yield Index pub-
lished immediately preceding the first day of the calendar month in which the bonds are
sold." FLA. STAT. § 215.84(3) (1983).
166. FLA. STAT. § 125.013(3) (1983).
167. By setting the limit on interest as it did in id. § 215.84(3), the legislature invested
broad discretion in the governmental authorities. A "zero" bond which carried a rate of
return less than the maximum set by the legislature was in fact used by the Florida Housing
Finance Agency in 1982. One bond issue might contain several interest rates based on differ-
ing maturities of bonds in the issue, but with an average net interest cost below the maxi-
mum allowable.
168. See Town of Medley v. State, 162 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1964): "[Iun the absence of a
provision of law requiring public sale of bonds or certificates of indebtedness, the issuing
authority may adopt such method of sale as in their best judgment, in the exercise of a
sound discretion, will be for the best interest of the municipality." Id. at 260 (citing State v.
City of Daytona Beach, 42 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1949)).
169. See Town of Riviera Beach v. State, 53 So. 2d 828, 831 (Fla. 1951); Crowe v. City of
Jacksonville Beach, 167 So. 2d 753, 755-56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964).
170. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 125.013(2) (1983).
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parking garage.
The first, an industrial park, might raise public purpose ques-
tions. A municipality might determine that creation of an indus-
trial park, perhaps devoted to warehousing and light manufactur-
ing, would present a significant opportunity to attract new
employers to an area that has been stagnant in the development of
new jobs even though no specific companies have yet been identi-
fied to use the industrial park. The municipality has a tract of land
in mind which currently houses structures suitable only for demoli-
tion. What is needed is the acquisition of that land, demolition of
the structures on that land, improvements to the water and sewer
system serving the area, and relocation of streets and street light-
ing. The final product would then be sold or leased to the private
entities attracted by the economic suitability of the park. The mu-
nicipality, however, is unable to finance the development from cur-
rent tax revenues.
The public purpose aspect to the project may become a stum-
bling block to such a revenue bond financing. In State v. Town of
North Miami,17 1 the Florida Supreme Court rejected an attempt
by North Miami to issue bonds to finance the acquisition of land
and construction of a manufacturing facility for lease to a private
corporation. The court found that the public purpose requirements
had not been met.
Our organic law prohibits the expenditure of public money for
a private purpose. It does not matter whether the money is de-
rived by ad valorem taxes, by gift, or otherwise. It is public
money and under our organic law public money cannot be appro-
priated for a private purpose or used for the purpose of acquiring
property for the benefit of a private concern. It does not matter
what such undertakings may be called or how worthwhile they
may appear to be at the passing moment. The financing of private
enterprises by means of public funds is entirely foreign to a
proper concept of our constitutional system. Experience has
shown that such encroachments will lead inevitably to the ulti-
mate destruction of the private enterprise system.17 1
171. 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952). While the court has accepted the public purpose of eco-
nomic development in Linscott v. Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth., 443 So. 2d 97 (Fla.
1983), the court clearly emphasized that the bonds issued in that case " 'impose[d] no obli-
gation on the public.'" Id. at 101 (quoting State v. Housing Fin. Auth., 376 So. 2d 1158,
1160 (Fla. 1979)). In situations such as in North Miami, an obligation would be placed on
the public in the form of a pledge of certain taxes.
172. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d at 785.
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An industrial park scenario was recently presented to the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Byrd v. County of Florence,'73 where
the court reached a conclusion similar to that of the Florida Su-
preme Court in Town of North Miami. 1 4 The bonds were general
obligations supported by the pledge of ad valorem tax revenues.
The South Carolina Constitution requires that general obligation
debt be incurred only for a public purpose. 75 The court concluded
that the industrial park could not further a public purpose:
The Court should first determine the ultimate goal or benefit to
the public intended by the project. Second, the Court should ana-
lyze whether public or private parties will be the primary benefi-
ciaries. Third, the speculative nature of the project must be con-
sidered. Fourth, the Court must analyze and balance the
probability that the public interest will be ultimately served and
to what degree.
The primary beneficiaries, if any, of this project would be pri-
vate businesses. They would be spared analysis cost, costs of
roads, sewer, water and electricity facilities. Their benefits are
great and certain. The benefits to the taxpayers are highly specu-
lative at best.176
Despite this South Carolina decision, few would today question
the public purpose behind economic development, and the Florida
Supreme Court today might be expected to arrive at a different
conclusion than it did in Town of North Miami, or distinguish its
earlier decision. In other jurisdictions, promotion of economic de-
velopment is now thought of as "a matter of state policy,"1 77 and
part of the state's responsibility is "to provide for the welfare and
prosperity of its inhabitants.' ' 78 The creation of an industrial park
devoted to light manufacturing does not simply provide benefits in
the form of jobs attributable to the private entity drawn to the
industrial park. Such economic development also serves to reduce
the public welfare costs associated with the unemployed. Depend-
173. 315 S.E.2d 804 (S.C. 1984).
174. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d at 785.
175. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 14(4).
176. Byrd, 315 S.E.2d at 806-07.
177. Elliott v. McNair, 156 S.E.2d 421, 427 (S.C. 1967).
178. Id. at 428. Contrast the decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Ferrell v.
Doak, 275 S.W. 29 (Tenn. 1925), and McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 314 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn.
1958). In the latter decision, the court concluded that to provide against the "evils" of low
wages and unemployment "is clearly a public or corporate purpose." Id. at 20.
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ing on the location of the industrial park, it may also serve to re-
duce the costs associated with crime in the area targeted for revi-
talization. The ad valorem tax base will most likely increase, with a
further effect in surrounding areas.179 Private businesses are only
incidental beneficiaries of any windfall that might come from the
development of an industrial park. As Justice Ness pointed out in
his dissent in Byrd, "[A]ttraction of industry to the state will em-
ploy our labor force and utilize our natural resources which in-
crease our tax bases and incomes and thereby improves the state's
overall quality of living. ' 80
Town of North Miami itself provides some room for the court to
move towards Justice Ness' position. The court suggested the re-
sult there might have been different if slum clearance and removal
of blighted areas had been involved or if the project were serving
"some such other undertaking for the protection and conservation
of the public health, or to eliminate crime-breeding places or to
conserve the morals, or protect the lives and limbs of the
people."' s
Additional arguments are available to illustrate public purposes
involved in the industrial park situation. State v. Manatee County
Port Authority,1 82 which balanced the predominance of the public
purpose over the private benefit, could support a limited reading of
City of North Miami. Furthermore, in State v. Daytona Beach
Racing & Recreational Facilities District,"'3 the court found that
the public purpose of promoting tourism predominated over the
private benefit in the lease to a private enterpreneur of a racetrack
constructed and owned by Daytona Beach. Given such broadening
case law and the current evolution of economic development con-
cepts, the Florida Supreme Court should be prepared to expand
the public purpose analysis to recognize the public benefit derived
from such projects as a revenue bond financing of the cost of land
acquisition and infrastructure improvements for an industrial
park.
The second situation, which might easily arise in Florida today,
179. For example, several studies have demonstrated the economic impact of investment
in mass transit facilities. See Callies, A Hypothetical Case: Value Capture/Joint Develop-
ment Techniques To Reduce the Public Costs of Public Improvements, 16 URB. L. ANN. 155
(1979); Plant & White, Mass Transit As a Development Stimulus: The Metro Example, 6
S. PUB. AD. 504 (1983).
180. Byrd, 315 S.E.2d at 808 (Ness, J., dissenting).
181. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d at 787.
182. 193 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1966).
183. 89 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1956).
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concerns a municipality that wants to develop its tourism industry
by constructing a convention center that would be available for
meetings, trade shows, and similar activities. Feasibility studies
have demonstrated to the municipality that such a convention
center can be successful only if it incorporates a hotel and parking
facilities. The municipality is unable to find a private developer
who is willing to undertake the risk of constructing the hotel. Con-
sequently, the municipality wants to construct all facilities and
lease the hotel to a company in the lodging industry.
Counsel for the municipality must determine if revenue bonds,
based on project revenues augmented by excise tax revenues,
might serve as a legitimate means of financing the entire facility.
State v. City of Miami184 would appear to support revenue bond
financing of the convention center and parking garage portion of
the project. In City of Miami, a similar complex was thought to
provide "a forum for educational, civic and commercial activities"
as well as to "increase tourism and international trade," which
were valid public purposes.1 85 The hotel in that case, however, was
to be constructed and operated by the developer. Yet, in the pre-
sent hypothetical, if it can be demonstrated that the hotel is in
fact necessary to the success of the convention center and that pri-
vate enterprise could not be expected to make the investment in
construction of the hotel, the hotel ought to fulfill a public purpose
as part of the convention center project. Whatever private benefit
flows from the operating lease of the hotel to a private entity
should not divert the focus of the analysis away from the purpose
of the project when considered as a whole.
The municipality may also be concerned that revenues from
parking, convention center rent, and lease payments from the hotel
would be insufficient to service the bonded debt. In the alternative,
even if that revenue stream were sufficient, the pledge of addi-
tional revenues might be necessary to ensure access to the investor
market. In this case the municipality could use a pledge of non-ad
valorem revenue sources in order to meet any deficit.""
V. CONCLUSION
American society has gone through dramatic economic changes
in this century, and Florida's history has been one of the most dra-
184. 379 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1980).
185. Id. at 653.
186. State v. City of West Palm Beach, 125 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1960).
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matic. Each business cycle of boom and bust has produced a major
effect on the rules governing the issuance of municipal bonds in
Florida. The free-wheeling provisions that characterized the early
twentieth century led to municipal defaults when revenues evapo-
rated in the 1930's. To protect property owners, restrictive consti-
tutional provisions were adopted, and, of great significance, the
courts assumed a role as protector of the taxpayers.
The needs of municipalities shifted after World War II, and an
expanding economy forced the courts to move away from the
strictly protective role by creating legal fictions to avoid unduly
restricting the issuance of municipal bonds. The drafters of the
1968 constitutional amendments tried to reconcile the seemingly
inconsistent judicial interpretations by setting forth in new consti-
tutional language more liberal rules appropriate for the future. The
passage of time has demonstrated that this approach has in large
degree been judicially accepted. However, while the courts ac-
knowledge what occurred in 1968, they have at times lapsed into a
more restrictive approach which seeks to protect the taxpayers.
While the judiciary must remain alert to any attempted misuse
of public borrowing authority, it must also recognize that the 1968
constitutional amendments reflect that the public's capital needs
can only be met through borrowing. It must be recognized as well
that not only has society become more complex, but its citizens
have also become more sophisticated. Courts should therefore be
less quick to shoulder the protective mantle. Public officials should
be allowed to operate under straightforward rules and be trusted
to make prudent decisions. Whatever blemishes have developed on
the rules since the 1968 constitutional amendment, they should be
cleared away and definite operating guidelines thereby provided to
municipal officials. These individuals should then be accountable
to the electorate for the actions they take. If public officials are
thought to have breached these rules, the electorate should make
that judgment and not the judiciary. Elected public officials must
have the latitude which the constitution and Florida legislation
now allows them so that they may meet their communities' needs
of the foreseeable future.
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